OR/MS
Incentive to Ignore / One-Reader theorem
optimal audience size under coverage loss
Active working paper
The Incentive to Ignore
Synthesizes selective attention, audience design, and conditional evidence use.
Active working paper21 pages
Recommended citation
Nakajima, Yohei (2026). The Incentive to Ignore: Selective Attention and Audience Design in Distributed Discovery. Working paper.
BibTeX
@misc{Nakajima2026IncentiveToIgnore,
author = {Yohei Nakajima},
title = {The Incentive to Ignore: Selective Attention and Audience Design in Distributed Discovery},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {Working paper},
url = {https://yoheinakajima.github.io/distributed-discovery/publications/incentive-to-ignore.html},
note = {No DOI; validated public research artifact}
}Source and provenance
Read the build source · Inspect validation and provenance
Technical details
scientific: valid-with-scope · editorial: active · publication: public-working-paper · lifecycle: active-working-paper · no DOI · not submitted · not peer reviewed
The download is copied only after its SHA-256 matches the committed validation record.
SHA-256 651c91fb68df6b2f1397ca86f3842b7c2fa9c067601957c32401a7f5e95cd24b
Translation layer
Related formulations
These formulations translate a canonical object without changing its scientific scope.
Economics / AGT
Incentive to Ignore / One-Reader theorem
welfare effect of selective public-information access
Multi-agent AI
Incentive to Ignore / One-Reader theorem
route a shared clue to one acting agent while others retain independent tasks
Practitioner
Incentive to Ignore / One-Reader theorem
not everyone who can read the same signal should act on it